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OPINION OF THE COURT 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This appeal primarily raises a number of intriguing 
insurance law questions, one of which, the allocation of a 
deductible among several insurance carriers, is novel.  The 
insured entered into a series of "all risks" policies covering 
property losses during the policy period.  When the insurers 
rejected the claim of the insured, PECO Energy Company (PECO), it 
brought a diversity action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  The jury found that 
PECO sustained theft losses aggregating $1,229,029 over a period 
of six years.   
 The district court held that the combined thefts 
constituted a single occurrence and that it took place in the 
sixth year of the insurance coverage.  The court therefore 
applied the $100,000 deductible set forth in the policy for that 
year.  Accordingly, it entered judgment of $1,129,029 for PECO 
against Kenneth Henry Edmund Boden representing Lloyds 
Underwriters, London & Hull Maritime Insurance Company Limited, 
Insurance Company of North America (U.K.) Limited, The Yorkshire 
Insurance Company Limited, Indemnity Maritime Assurance Company 
Limited (collectively the Underwriters).  The Underwriters timely 
appealed.  We vacate and remand. 
I. 
3 
 PECO is a Pennsylvania electric utility with its 
principal place of business in Philadelphia.  In September 1984, 
it contracted with Diesel Services, Inc. (DSI), an independent 
trucking company, to haul its fuel oil to various PECO generating 
facilities.  DSI transported PECO oil until November 1990 when 
PECO discovered that DSI had been stealing a portion of the oil 
on a regular basis. 
 In November 1985 PECO entered into a contract for 
insurance covering property losses for one year from four 
independent insurance companies and six syndicates at Lloyds of 
London.  Between November 1986 and October 1991, PECO and the 
Underwriters renewed five one-year insurance policies .  The 
Underwriters for each policy varied from year to year, but the 
policies remained essentially the same.  The policies insured 
"GOODS and/or MERCHANDISE OF EVERY DESCRIPTION WHATSOEVER 
incidental to [PECO's] business but consisting principally of 
FUELS . . . shipped in and/or over . . . [a]gainst all risks of 
physical losses or damage however caused."  Both parties agree 
that these policies cover the theft of fuel oil. 
 Each policy provided that covered losses were subject 
to a deductible.  The 1985-86 policy states that: 
from the amount of each loss or combination 
of losses arising out of any one occurrence, 
an amount equal to 1% of the total value of 
the property to which loss or damage occurred 
shall be deducted.  This deductible, however, 




Each of the remaining policies provided that there shall be 
deducted "from the amount of each loss or combination of losses 
arising out of any one occurrence, US$100,000 any one loss or 
occurrence." 
 At trial, PECO acknowledged that it did not have any 
direct evidence of DSI thefts, except for a limited number 
observed by PECO investigators in 1990.  Nonetheless, PECO 
posited at trial that DSI had been stealing from it for the 
duration of the contract between them and that these thefts 
aggregated between 9.1% and 20% of the oil transported by DSI 
during the 62 month period that the Underwriters insured PECO.  
 The jury found that the DSI stole $1,229,029 worth of 
fuel from PECO, equal to 6.1% of the fuel transported by DSI, and 
that the thefts were part of a single continuous plan or scheme. 
The jury also determined that the Underwriters had not acted in 
bad faith toward the insured.  The district court held that DSI's 
thefts constituted one occurrence because they were part of a 
single continuous scheme and that this occurrence took place 
during the 1990-91 policy period.  The court applied the $100,000 
deductible provided for in the 1990-91 policy and entered 
judgment of $1,129,029 for PECO against the 1990-91 Underwriters. 
The Underwriters then moved to amend or correct the judgment 
and/or for a new trial or a judgment as a matter of law.  The 
district court denied these motions and the Underwriters timely 
appealed.1 
                     
1The district court possessed subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332.  This court has appellate 
5 
II. 
 A federal court must apply the choice of law rules of 
the forum state when it is sitting in diversity. Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).  Pennsylvania law 
provides that "the place having the most interest in the problem 
and which is the most intimately concerned with the outcome is 
the forum whose law should be applied." In re Complaint of 
Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 882 (3d Cir. 1984).  PECO and 
the Underwriters executed the insurance contracts at issue in 
this case in Pennsylvania and the oil which DSI stole was 
transported within Pennsylvania.  Additionally, the policies 
contain a choice of law clause designating Pennsylvania law as 
the law controlling any disputes which arise under the polices. 
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that 
Pennsylvania law applies to this case.   
 In Pennsylvania, interpreting an insurance contract is 
a question of law to be resolved by a court. Vale Chemical Co. v. 
Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co., 490 A.2d 896, 899 n.4 (Pa.Super. 
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 516 A.2d 684 (Pa. 1986).  We apply 
plenary review to legal determinations made by the district 
court.  Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. KMart Corp., 13 
F.3d 762, 765-766 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 On appeal, the Underwriters contend that:  (1) the 
series of thefts is not one occurrence; (2) if all of the thefts 
are one occurrence, the occurrence took place in 1984, when the 
                                                                  
jurisdiction over the district court's final judgment under 28 
U.S.C. section 1291.  
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Underwriters did not insure PECO; (3) a full deductible applies 
to each theft in which event the defendants would have no 
liability or alternatively a full deductible applies to each 
policy period which would reduce liability substantially; (4) the 
jury made mathematical errors in calculating PECO's damages; (5) 
the district court erred in awarding damages to PECO for oil 
stolen after March 1988 because PECO failed to take reasonable 
measures to stop DSI stealing after having been warned of DSI 
thefts; and (6) the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting certain testimony into evidence. 
III.   
 The threshold question on appeal is whether the 
multitude of thefts over the six-year period constituted a single 
occurrence.  In a careful and exhaustive opinion denying the 
Underwriters' post-trial motions, the district court held that 
the thefts in this case constituted a single occurrence.  Whether 
the losses here constituted one occurrence or amounted to a 
number of occurrences, as contended by the Underwriters, can have 
a significant impact on the amount of the liability, if any. 
Unfortunately, the policies do not provide a relevant definition 
of occurrence.2  If each theft amounted to an occurrence, then 
each became subject to the deductible provisions of the policy. 
If, however, all of the thefts constituted a single occurrence, 
                     
2The first two polices do state that an occurrence is "any one 
loss, disaster or casualty or series of losses, disasters or 
casualties arising out of one event."  However, this definition 
only applied to additional building construction risks, not the 
entire policy.   
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then the deductible provision of the policy surfaced only once. 
We therefore look to other sources for assistance in defining 
this term.  To determine "whether bodily injury or property 
damage is the result of one occurrence or multiple occurrences, 
the majority of courts have looked to the cause or causes of the 
bodily injury or property damage . . . ."  B.R. Ostrager & T.R. 
Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes § 9.02 (7th ed. 
1994) (internal quotation, emphasis and brackets omitted).  
 In Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., we 
held that "an occurrence is determined by the cause or causes of 
the resulting injury" and noted that a court should determine "if 
there was but one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause 
which resulted in all of the injuries and damage." 676 F.2d 56, 
61 (3d Cir. 1982) (citations and internal quotation omitted).  If 
there is only one cause for all of the losses, they are part of a 
single occurrence. Id.; see also Armotek Industries, Inc. v. 
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 952 F.2d 756, 762 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(policy defined "occurrence" as "`an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in . 
. . property damage . . ..'"); Business Interiors, Inc. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 751 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1984) (series of forty 
acts of forgery by dishonest employee are deemed a single 
occurrence). 
 The jury found that DSI instituted its scheme to steal 
from PECO in 1984 and continued stealing from PECO until it 
discovered the thefts in 1990.  The jury also found that each 
theft was a part of a larger scheme and that the scheme to steal 
8 
was the proximate cause of each theft.  We therefore hold that 
when a scheme to steal property is the proximate and continuing 
cause of a series or combination of thefts, the losses for 
liability insurance purposes constitute part of a single 
occurrence.  Accordingly, the district court committed no error 
in concluding that numerous thefts by DSI amount to one 
occurrence.    
B. 
 The district court concluded that the policies in this 
case were "occurrence" policies.  "An occurrence policy provides 
coverage for any 'occurrence' which takes place during the policy 
period.  Under this type of policy, it is irrelevant whether the 
resulting claim is brought against the insured during or after 
the policy period, as long as the injury-causing event happens 
during the policy period."  B. Ostrager & T.R. Newman § 8.03(a). 
See Gereboff v. Home Indemnity Co., 383 A.2d 1024, 1026 n.1 (R.I. 
1978), quoting 7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4504.3 
at 104-15 (Cum. Supp. 1974).  The district court therefore 
followed this court's holding in Appalachian, 676 F.2d at 61-62, 
and held that "the occurrence took place on November 21, 1990," 
the date the jury found that PECO first knew of the thefts.  The 
court accordingly ruled that the 1990-91 policy bore the 
liability subject to a single $100,000 deduction. 
 The policies in this case, however, insured "[a]gainst 
all risks of physical losses or damage however caused." (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the policies in this case are "all risks" 
policies, not "occurrence" policies, and provided coverage for 
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all losses which took place during the policy period. See e.g. 
Intermetal Mexicana, S.A. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 866 
F.2d 71, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1989); Rorer Group v. Insurance Co. of 
North America, 655 A.2d 123, 124 (Pa.Super. 1995).3 
 This court need not consider the Underwriters' 
contention that the district court erred by holding that the 
occurrence at issue in this case took place in 1990, because the 
date of the occurrence is irrelevant.  Under an all risks 
insurance policy, the Underwriters are liable for all losses 
which PECO suffered during the relevant policy periods, 
regardless of when the occurrence which triggered those losses 
took place.  Thus, the district court erred in placing the total 
liability for all of PECO's losses on the 1990-91 underwriters. 
C. 
 The jury calculated PECO's losses during each policy 
period.  The Underwriters are liable for those losses minus the 
appropriate deductible.  The district court correctly applied a 
single deductible to PECO's total loss.  However, the court 
applied the deductible against the full liability it imposed for 
all of PECO's losses on the 1990-91 Underwriters.  The policies 
divide liability on an annual basis because of their "all risks" 
language, but they call for one deductible per occurrence.  We 
                     
3
"Under Pennsylvania law, when language in an insurance policy is 
clear and unambiguous, a court must give effect to that 
language." Armotek Indus., 952 F.2d at 762 (citing Northern 
Insurance Co. v. Aardvark Associates, 942 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 
1991); Gene and Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs' Asso. 
Ins. Co., 517 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 1986)). 
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agree with the district court and the jury that the entire scheme 
of thefts constituted a single occurrence. 
 On appeal, the Underwriters contend that a full 
deductible applies to each loss.  Alternatively, they argue that 
a full deductible applies to each policy year.  We reject these 
arguments because it would be inconsistent to break a single 
occurrence into multiple occurrences for the purpose of applying 
a deductible.  The dissent, however, would aggregate six 
deductibles and arrive at a total of $520,000 for a single 
occurrence.  The parties never contracted for such a result. 
 It seems to us that the most equitable and logical 
application of the policies' language to the realities of this 
case is to take the loss sustained by PECO each year and 
determine what percentage of the total insured loss it 
represents.  We then apply the percentage thus derived to the 
deductible for each policy year and the resulting figure is 
deducted from the loss for that particular year.  The 
Underwriters of each annual policy are thus liable for a 
percentage of PECO's total loss less that percentage of the 
stated policy deductible. 
 The jury found that the total loss suffered by PECO 
between November 1985 and December 31, 1990 was $1,229,029.  They 
then allocated this loss on an annual basis and found that PECO 
lost:  $142,218 in 1985-86; $371,287 in 1986-87; $202,561 in 
1987-88; $235,008 in 1988-89; $241,933 in 1989-90; and $36,022 in 
1990-91. 
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 The percentage of the total losses sustained in each of 
the foregoing years respectively, commencing in November 1985, 
was:  11.6%, 30.2%, 16.5%, 19.1%, 19.7%, and 2.9%.  Applying this 
percentage to the deductible in each policy produces the 
following figures:  $2,320 for 1985-86;4 $30,200 for 1986-87;5 
$16,500 for 1987-88; $19,100 for 1988-89; $19,700 for 1989-90; 
and $2,900 for 1990-91. 
 As a consequence, we concluded that the liability under 
the 1985-86 policy is $139,898 and the liabilities under the 
succeeding policies are $341,087 for 1986-87; $186,061 for 1987-
88; $215,908 for 1988-89; $222,233 for 1989-90; $33,122 for 1990-
91. 
 These calculations equitably provide each group of 
Underwriters with a deductible based on a single occurrence, as 
the policies provide. 
D. 
 The Underwriters next argue that the jury reached its 
verdict through a strict mathematical formula and that it erred 
in calculating that formula.  The district court refused to 
disturb the jury's damage award because it was not shockingly 
excessive.  The court noted that PECO presented three different 
damage calculation methods and that the jury's verdict was 
                     
4The deductible for 1985-86 is $20,000.  See p. 3, supra, for its 
specific terms.  PECO demonstrated that it shipped $2,331,442 
worth of fuel in 1985-86.  1% of this amount equals $23,314 which 
exceeds $20,000.  Therefore, this court will use a $20,000 
deductible to calculate the liability of the underwriters for the 
1985-86 policy. 
5This policy and the remaining policies provide for a $100,000 
deductible. 
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reasonable in light of the evidence submitted at trial.  We 
agree. 
 The Underwriters concede that courts normally use the 
shockingly excessive standard to review jury verdicts, but argue 
that courts should review the calculation methods of a jury in 
cases which are "susceptible to mathematical formula." Chuy v. 
Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1279 n.19 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  The Underwriters state the law correctly, but it 
does not apply to this case.  In the special interrogatories 
submitted by the court, the jury found that PECO suffered losses 
of $1,229,029.  PECO presented three measures of loss ranging 
from approximately 9.1% of DSI's deliveries to 20%.  The jury 
concluded that PECO had lost $1,229,029.  This is equal to 6.1% 
of the oil delivered by DSI, but the Underwriters do not show 
that the jury arrived at this damage figure through a strict 
mathematical calculation or that it misapplied a mathematical 
formula in determining the amount of loss.  The district court 
did not err in refusing to review the jury's damage calculations, 
except for excessiveness, and in concluding that the award in 
this case was not excessive. 
E. 
 The Underwriters also argue that the district court 
erred in awarding damages to PECO for oil stolen after March, 
1988.  They contend that PECO's failure to discover DSI's thefts 
after that date was a violation of PECO's obligation under the 
insurance policy to avert or minimize loss.   
13 
 This court has predicted that Pennsylvania will adopt 
the Restatement of Contracts' requirement that an insured must 
prove that losses were fortuitous before it can recover under an 
all risks insurance policy.  Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. 
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 724 F.2d 369, 372 (3d Cir. 1983).  The 
restatement defines a fortuitous event as: 
an event which so far as the parties to the 
contract are aware, is dependent on chance. 
It may be beyond the power of any human being 
to bring the event to pass; it may be within 
the control of third persons; . . . provided 
that the fact is unknown to the parties. 
 
Id. (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 291 comment a (1932)) 
(emphasis in original); accord Intermetal Mexicana, 866 F.2d at 
77. 
 The jury found that PECO had no actual knowledge of 
DSI's thefts prior to November, 1990 but should have known of the 
thefts as of March, 1988.  The Underwriters argue that PECO had 
constructive knowledge of DSI's thefts after March 1988 and that 
the losses after that date were not fortuitous.  Proving fortuity 
is not particularly difficult. Intermetal Mexicana, 866 F.2d at 
77.  A party must only show that a loss was unplanned and 
unintentional. See Peters Township School Dist. v. Hartford Acci. 
and Indem. Co., 833 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1987).  The Underwriters 
simply do not present any law which suggests that risks about 
which a party should have known are not fortuitous. 
 The Underwriters essentially argue that PECO was 
negligent in not discovering DSI's thefts.  Both parties agree 
that the policies in this case are "all risks" cargo transit 
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insurance.  At trial, citing Commodities Reserve Co. v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 879 F.2d 640, 642 (9th Cir. 1989), the 
Underwriters agreed that they would be liable for any losses if 
the policies provided coverage for the proximate cause of those 
losses, even if the losses were precipitated by a combination of 
causes. Thus, the jury's determination that the DSI thefts were 
the proximate cause of PECO's losses renders the negligence 
element of the Underwriters' argument irrelevant.  Therefore, the 
district court properly ruled that PECO was not legally barred 
from recovering damages for losses after March, 1988. 
F. 
 Lastly, the Underwriters maintain that the district 
court abused its discretion by admitting certain testimony into 
evidence.  At trial a PECO investigator, Ed Chiu, testified to a 
conversation between him and Bill Joyce, a DSI driver.6  Chiu 
testified that Joyce told him that the owner of DSI instructed 
Joyce to steal from PECO.  PECO used this evidence to show that 
DSI implemented a long-term scheme to steal from PECO.  The 
Underwriters contend that the admission of this statement was 
prejudicial error.   
 This court reviews district court decisions regarding 
the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. In re 
Merritt Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1990).  We find 
no abuse of discretion here. 
                     
6At trial, Joyce asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and 
refused to testify.  The district court therefore found that he 
was "unavailable" as a witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1).  The 
underwriters do not contest this finding. 
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 Chiu testified that: 
Mr. Joyce informed me that he was told by 
[DSI owner] Danny Jackson to steal on 
approximately 75% of the deliveries and he 
was supposed to steal for between three and 
five minutes. 
 
The district court admitted this evidence as a statement against 
interest under Rule 804(b)(3), Fed. R. Evid.7  The Underwriters 
argue that this statement is not a statement against Joyce's 
interest and thus does not fall within the exception.  A person's 
admission that he stole for someone else is as much against his 
interest as an admission that he stole for himself.  It subjects 
him to possible criminal responsibility and civil liability.  The 
district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that 
Joyce's statement was against his interest and admitting Chiu's 
testimony pertaining to Joyce's statement. 
III. 
 Summarizing, we reject the Underwriters' claims that 
the district court misapplied the law or abused its discretion in 
refusing to reduce the jury's award, in allowing damages after 
the date when PECO should have known of the thefts and in the 
                     
7The rule provides that: 
 
A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far 
tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability, or to render invalid a 
claim by the declarant against another, that 
a reasonable person in the declarant's 
position would not have made the statement 
unless believing it to be true [are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant 
is unavailable as a witness]. 
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admission of the Chiu testimony.  The court also concluded 
correctly that the multitude of thefts constituted a single 
occurrence.  We hold, however, that when a group of underwriters 
or insurers write all risks insurance against property losses 
which take place during a policy term, the insurers are liable 
for those losses sustained during the policy period.  Further, we 
hold that when multiple policies provide for one deductible per 
occurrence, the appropriate and equitable manner of treating the 
deductible under such circumstances is to calculate the 
percentage of the loss sustained in each policy year to the total 
loss to ascertain the deductible for that particular year.   
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
vacated and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment 
in favor of PECO and against the appellants consistent with this 
opinion. 
 Each side to bear its own costs. 
17 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
 The court reads the policies in a way that make the 
extent of each syndicate's liability depend on the insured's loss 
experience before and after the period covered by its policy. 
Because I believe this clearly was not intended by the parties, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 I agree with the court that the syndicate of 
underwriters that issued each particular policy should be held 
liable for the harms that PECO suffered during the period that 
the policy was in effect.  The court and I part company on our 
reading of the deductible clauses, however.  I would hold that 
PECO's recovery during each policy period should be offset by the 
full amount of the deductible stated in the policy to be 
applicable to losses during the policy period arising out of any 
one occurrence. 
 Under each policy, a certain amount -- $20,000 or 
$100,000 -- must be deducted "from the amount of each loss or 
combination of losses arising out of any one occurrence."  (See, 
e.g., app. III at E-252.)  Put another way, each policy requires 
that the amount recoverable for losses suffered during the policy 
year must be reduced by the total deductible for each 
"occurrence" which led to the losses.  For me, these policy 
provisions preclude the court's conclusion that only one 
18 
deductible is applicable to the losses incurred over the six-year 
period.   
 Suppose, for example, that PECO for some reason had 
decided to sue only the syndicate that had issued the policy 
covering PECO's losses between November 1989 and October 1990. 
PECO suffered losses of $241,933 for that time period and the 
1989-1990 syndicate accordingly would be liable to pay that 
amount minus the applicable deductible.  To calculate the 
deductible, the court would be faced with the simple question: 
are the losses here due to one occurrence or are they due to more 
than one occurrence?  As the court cogently explains, the covered 
losses in each policy period had one cause -- the trucking firm's 
single scheme pursuant to which the drivers were instructed to 
continually syphon in the same manner -- and accordingly are all 
due to one occurrence.  In my view, the court in this 
hypothetical case would be required to deduct a single deductible 
of $100,000 from the total amount of PECO's losses, producing a 
judgment of $141,933. 
 I would apply a similar analysis if PECO then decided 
to sue the syndicate that insured its losses for the 1985 to 1986 
time period or any other year-long time period.  In that second 
case, PECO would be entitled to recover the losses it suffered 
during the covered year-long time period, minus the applicable 
deductible.  To calculate the deductible, the court again would 
have to decide that the losses for the particular year all had 
one cause and that there accordingly was only one occurrence. For 
the 1986 to 1987 period, for example, the court would subtract 
19 
the $100,000 deductible from PECO's losses of $371,287 to yield a 
judgment of $271,287.   
 This same analysis would govern how the court should 
calculate the amount of PECO's recovery if it decided to sue each 
of the six syndicates in six separate cases.  The only difference 
here is that rather than suing each syndicate separately, PECO 
decided to sue the syndicates together in one case.  That all of 
the syndicates are together here as defendants should not change 
the above analysis, however, nor should it affect the amount of 
each syndicate's liability.  Thus, in my view, each syndicate's 
liability should be reduced by the deductible applicable to that 
policy period. 
 Following the court's approach, however, the syndicate 
sued in the first case would be entitled to a reduction of 
liability for only a certain fraction of the deductible bargained 
for and that fraction would depend on the total losses PECO 
suffered during periods both before and after the 1989-1990 
policy period.  This result would follow regardless of whether 
PECO decided to sue the other five syndicates in subsequent 
suits.  The end effect of this is that the 1989-1990 syndicate's 
liability would be increased to reflect harms PECO suffered 
during periods not covered by the policy period; that is, the 
syndicate's liability would depend on losses PECO suffered during 
periods which the syndicate never agreed to insure. 
 This cannot be what the parties intended.  In my view, 
each syndicate contracted for a deductible from covered losses 
which took place during the policy period, and each is entitled 
20 
to one.  Thus, I would instruct the district court to deduct the 
full amount of the deductible for each policy period. 
